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The former Lee Myung-bak government in South Korea had been biased toward the logic of 
efficiency rather than toward the logic of publicity in its information and telecommunications policy. It 
has kept the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) as a government-backed, powerful regulatory 
body in response to the trend of convergence between media and communication technologies, even 
though many scholars have warned that they could not find any constitutional foundations for 
establishing the KCC. Moreover, the Korean National Assembly, dominated by the conservative Grand 
National Party, has revised several new media laws in order to lift the cross-ownership ban on 
newspapers and TV stations. Both cases tell us that the Korean government de-regulated media 
industries for efficiency and competitiveness, while re-regulating a civil society that has expanded so 
much to threaten the government’s authority despite criticisms that it would hamper policy publicity 
and the diversification of broadcasting industries. The paper introduces these cases of regulation 
politics in the Lee government in South Korea and discusses its implications about political 
relationship between government and civil society equipped with information and communications 
technologies. 
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The emergence of South Korea as a leading country in information technology and wired 
broadband networks for the last decade has also been known as a pioneer of both the new 
knowledge economy and democratization. In particular, the flourishing social activities of 
Korean citizens in every field of everyday life have become a symbol of the transformative 
power of information technologies. The candlelight demonstration in the spring of 2008 
against the government-led negotiations for importing beef rumored to be contaminated by 
mad cow disease, was regarded as one more instance of recalcitrant social movements in a 
democratizing Korea. This seems to have led the South Korean government of President Lee 
Myung-bak to lead a rejuvenated coalition among conservatives, to confront the ‘smart 
mobs’ who have equipped themselves with sophisticated IT-based technologies and ever 
expanding democratic aspirations. 
Two cases are introduced in this chapter about this struggle between the Korean 
government and the civil society. They will show how the Korean government has been 
troubled by the uncompromising purposes of IT-related policies and regulations – between 
efficiency and publicity. The first case was about the establishment of the Korea 
Communications Commission (KCC) in 2008, which was to be an independent regulatory 
body for the information and communication sectors (Cho, 2009:490). The second case deals 
with the revision of media laws in 2009 that allowed big companies and foreign investors to 
acquire more shares in media industries. In both cases, the Korean government has 
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accelerated institutional arrangements and legislation regarding the new IT-based social 
communication mechanisms. The core question in these cases should be: “How well does the 
Korean government keep the balance between the two contradictory principles of efficiency 
and publicity?” 
The answer, by now, is “not very well.” It seems that the Lee Myung-bak government 
had been biased toward the logic of efficiency rather than toward the logic of publicity. It has 
kept the KCC as a government-backed, powerful regulatory body in response to the trend of 
convergence between media and communication technologies, even though many scholars 
have warned that they could not find any constitutional foundations for establishing the 
KCC.1 Moreover, the Korean National Assembly, dominated by the conservative Grand 
National Party, has revised a couple of media laws in order to lift the cross-ownership ban on 
newspapers and TV stations. Both cases tell us that the Korean government de-regulated 
media industries for efficiency and competitiveness, while re-regulating a civil society that 
has expanded so much to threaten the government’s authority despite criticisms that it would 
hamper policy publicity and the diversification of broadcasting industries.  
As such, the recent cases of the Korean government’s biting back against civil society 
should be understood as a response by the conservative ruling elites who know the 
instrumentality and utility of information and communication technologies, even though 
those technologies have transformed the landscapes of political institutions and democracy in 
South Korea during the last decade. These episodes imply that the technological 
developments and related social changed may never been utilized only by a faction. They 
send a message that information technologies and communication patterns may be neutral: 
Sometimes civil societies may rise due to the developments of ICT, while retrenched ruling 
elites may strike back against those civil societies as they catch up newly emerging 
technologies and resultant social transformations. As Lee Myung-bak government was 
turned over by another conservative government of Park Geun-hye, the tension between 
government and civil society due to the technological innovations within South Korea may 
have another momentum in the coming future. 
This paper discusses the two cases of intensified governmental initiatives in regulating 
information and communication technologies in South Korea. President Lee Myung-bak 
suggested a blueprint of historical turning points for Korea and Asia, while focusing on the 
increasing role of businesses in the future. A revitalized economy and the unleashing of new 
chances for continuous growth and prosperity would upgrade South Korea’s national image 
and its status in the world society (Han, 2008:206). 2  What consequences have these 
                                                          
1 The KCC, established as a new regulatory commission of the Korean government in February 2008, 
was an integrated governmental organization comprised of the former Korea Broadcasting 
Commission (KBC), the Ministry of Information of Communication (MIC) and the old Korea 
Communications Commission (KCC) as an agency of the MIC. The KBC was an independent 
commission for policy and regulation of broadcasting, which represented a symbol of Korean 
democratization against the long ruling of conservative elites. The MIC was a monoctatic 
governmental ministry responsible for ICT-related policy planning and implementation. The old KCC 
was regulating major activities articulated in the Electronic Communications Fundamental Law and 
the Electronic Communications Business Law. All of these regulating functions was intended to be 
integrated into the newly established KCC (Lee, 2009:104). 
2 The KCC was originally intended to follow the goals and structure of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in the United States. However, unlike the FCC, the KCC did not have enough 




initiatives produced between 2008 and 2009? What are the implications of these cases in the 
long history between government and the newly emerging civil society in South Korea? The 
next section introduces background history of new commitments of ICT regulation by Lee’s 
government. Two stories about establishing a new media regulator, the KCC, and the 
revision of media laws will be provided in the following sections. The final section discusses 
theoretical and practical implications of the two cases. 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND OF NEW COMMITMENTS 
 
South Korea has ranked among the top countries in Internet usage and broadband 
communication technologies. This has been backed up by IT-related hardware industries, 
which have accounted for one-third of South Korean exports. The national IT strategies were 
based upon government policies which had been not only adopted to promote related 
industries, but also adapted to the transformations of global and domestic societies (Shin, 
2008:1785-1786). In 2007, more than ninety percent of Korean families were using 
broadband services. As such, industries have been trying to meet increasing market demands 
with more sophisticated and user-friendly technologies. These technologies include 
convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting, voice and data services, wired 
and wireless services.3 Considering the high ratio of foreign trade in the South Korean 
economy and the potentials of IT industries in world trade, it seems reasonable for the South 
Korean government to encourage the development of information and media technologies 
and their ultimate convergence. 
Information and knowledge have been regarded as two major resources of national 
wealth in the previous regimes by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. This had been clear 
since the late 1990s. President Kim had suggested building a creative knowledge-based 
nation in 1998, when he initiated rescue plans to save his country from the Asia-wide 
financial crisis that had swept across many developing countries in the region. He thought 
that the fields of information and knowledge are areas where Koreans might enjoy a 
competitive advantage within the globalized world economy. Thus he established the 
Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) and designated one of the elite business 
leaders as the first Minister of the MIC.4 He also started the Cyber-Korea 21 plan which was 
oriented toward four main goals: building infrastructures of information; encouraging 
productivity and transparency of government, enterprise and individuals using those 
information infrastructures; job promotion through information technologies; and nurturing 
                                                          
grounds for becoming an independent constitutional agency in South Korea. The deficiency in 
constitutional legitimization of the KCC caused a lot of debates on the status of the KCC amongst 
scholars (Kye, 2009:348-349; Jung, 2007:26-29). 
3 The trend of convergence between broadcasting and telecommunications has facilitated the process of 
disintegration of regulation boundaries, which has been clear in conventional legal systems. This 
implies a new effort for revised legal framework for the trend is necessary at the state level (Yum, 
2009:7-8). 
4 President Kim Dae-jung’s idea was that the only way for Korea to revive its economy under the threat 
of global financial crisis is building information- and knowledge-based country beyond the 
industrialization policy of the previous regimes such as Park Jung-hee in the 1970s (Kim, 2010:159-
161). 
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IT commodities and services as strategic fields for South Korean industries.5 
One of the examples that demonstrate the government-backed IT effort in South Korea 
was the former IT839 master plan that had been implemented between 2004 and 2008 by 
President Roh Moo-hyun. Its economic and social impact on South Korea was much greater 
than expected. Having successfully pioneered the first-generation of the Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) mobile telecommunications services in the 1990s, South Korea 
had deployed more sophisticated technologies such as Wideband CDMA and Orthogonal 
Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) technologies under the IT839 master plan. The 
result of these efforts has been to transform South Korea into an exceptionally strong leader 
in those IT dimensions that are essential in promoting national economic strategies in the age 
of globalization (Shin, 2007:625-626). As such, South Korea has become a model of 
government-led industrialization in the field of IT and media industries such as 
telecommunications companies, cable television operators, IT manufacturers and software 
developers.  
On the other hand, the South Korean government has been pursuing a series of legal 
measures to block anti-governmental social networking movements through the Internet and 
newly emerging multimedia platforms. In 2008, one of major targets of the governmental 
drive was the Internet portal space, where a couple of forum chat rooms are provided for the 
free exchange of opinions including critiques on government policies. The South Korean 
government consequently suggested a bill that requires all Internet users to register with their 
real names. This is an easy measure as far as the government controls major Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) such as Naver and Daum. These companies cannot pursue independent 
policies because so many IT- and Internet-related commodities and services have been 
facilitated and encouraged by government. The KCC, as an integrated government agency 
responsible for these monitoring duties, was established in early 2008 amidst much 
controversy. 
Lee Myung-bak’s government, which was essentially a conservative political faction that 
replaced the ten-year rule of progressives led by Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-
jung, has been troubled by the diffusion of social communication networks and real-time 
opinion exchanges among people since taking office. Mass demonstrations and critical 
opinions were directed at the government arising from the re-import of American beef as 
they were thought to increase the risk of mad-cow disease. The new South Korean 
government and the ruling Grand National Party shared the impression that a lot of 
misinformation had been spread without any checks on the Internet, so the best measure 
against this conundrum was to control this diffusion mechanism at the infrastructural level. 
With Web controls in place, major social unrest and mass protests should no longer be 
influenced by wild rumors and unreasonable critiques on the Net. This control is exercised 
when the KCC monitors and checks the major ISPs which manage the Internet gateways for 
most Internet users in South Korea. These ISPs, having initially failed in facilitating a well-
informed order on the Net, might now be transformed into filtering platforms for ‘emotional, 
unfounded, and rampant messes’ generated by unruly public opinion. 
The Japanese government has also compelled ISPs to conduct self-regulation with more 
                                                          
5 He also tried to step up the level of information-based education as he thought human factors are the 
only resource for Koreans to build a wealthy economy without plentiful natural resources and 
indigenous financial seeds (Kim, 2010:439-443). As a result of these efforts, Seoul, the capital of 
South Korea, took first in the evaluation of e-government performance among 100 cities in 2002. 




social responsibility. This has been criticized by civil societies as a non-democratic measure 
that will ruin the principle of independent media. The situation in China is more serious than 
Korea’s since the government there has banned the connections to some foreign-based 
Internet sites. This policy has been accompanied by high-tech monitoring and pre-emptive 
procedures against any anti-governmental propaganda and movements. In this process, of 
course, the burden of control and surveillance is shifted onto the ISPs, so they have to check 
whether any ideological, political, and non-acceptable contents are flowing through their 
platforms. Recently, the Chinese government has been focusing their scans on information of 
human-rights and democratization on the Web. All of these measures are conducted in the 
name of self-regulation. Lee’s government, like Japan and China, had been actively 
considering Web monitoring as it had been criticized by Internet users angered over the 
resumption of imports of American beef. 
 The conservative mould of the Lee Myung-bak government signaled a transformation of 
policy orientation in media and communications regulation. The Roh Tae-woo and Kim 
Young-sam regimes in the 1990s had kept the market-oriented paradigm in media 
regulations that focused on the principle of efficiency. This was reversed in ten years when 
the government was controlled by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun by 2008. 
These former Presidents had emphasized two points in their media policies: the integration of 
the KCC and the increasing numbers of Internet users and audiences. Their intention for a 
new KCC was to eliminate the ‘bad habit’ of governmental controls in communicating with 
the public, which had been managed by a government agency—the Bureau of Public 
Information—and criticized as thwarting any two-way communications between the 
government and the civil society.6 In this context, the emergence of the integrated KCC was 
deemed by many South Koreans as a legitimate extension of ongoing democratic 
institutionalization. 
Although these efforts by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun intended to 
achieve forward-oriented goals for Korean society, their implementation appears not to be 
deeply appreciated. The reason was that, even though these liberal Presidents were sincere in 
their intentions for media independence, the traditional opposition from conservatives and 
clashes among social factions had not allowed institutionalization of electronic media 
freedoms. Specific policy guidelines and plans for new liberal media policies could not be 
initiated at this stage due to politicized social divisions. Market power was another obstacle 
for the Presidential aspiration. Big business and capital investors had cooperated with the 
liberal governments to the minimum while publicizing the gap between them. In this context, 
the policies of Presidents Kim and Roh could not be efficiently implemented as their original 
aims. Many policy plans had been controversial among interest groups and left vulnerable to 
the conservative critiques. As such, the former KBC could not coordinate or facilitate media-
related policies among diverse stakeholders. Civil society, nurtured by the democratic 
currents in this period, had contributed to many social conflicts on media and 
communications issues. 
 
                                                          
6 This regulation style was called vertical as it controls media and telecommunications businesses on 
the basis of physical networks and services. It represents an obstacle in the way for diverse services 
and equal access to the market in the eyes of liberals. As such, the old regulation system should have 
been transformed into a horizontal one for better performance and equal business opportunities (Lee, 
2008:54; Rhee, 2007:318-319; Kang, 2008:19-21). 
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3. ESTABLISHING A NEW MEDIA REGULATOR 
 
Building upon the experience of successful IT industries and burgeoning media 
regulations during the 1990s and the early 2000s, South Korea has attempted to introduce a 
new paradigm for managing convergent media technologies and social networks. Actually, 
the nerve centre of the newly integrated KCC was housed within the new government in 
2008. One of the public commitments by Lee’s party was the privatization of media, 
especially in broadcasting industries. The ruling party emphasized the industrial rather than 
social and cultural dimensions of broadcasting industries. In order to improve South Korean 
competitiveness and efficiency in world media markets, media industries should be nurtured 
by more investments and de-regulatory measures in the near future. More qualified media 
contents would make broadcasting services more sustainable and profitable. The trend of 
convergence among IT, media, communications, and broadcasting services had made these 
arguments more persuasive. Thus, by the end of 2007 when the national election was 
looming for the new government, the environments were ready for the conservatives to 
finalize the establishment of the new KCC, with a different goal of competitiveness and 
efficiency from the original one—independence and publicity—sought by the previous 
regimes. 
However, the arguments for the new KCC had to endure severe criticisms from civil 
society. The most cited reason against the privatization of broadcasting services was that 
market-oriented policies up till then had created oligopolistic ownerships and excessive 
competition among media businesses. 7  The invisible hand had not been working well, 
contradicting the argument of the Grand National Party and Lee’s government, not only in 
the media sector in South Korea but also in terms of the image of Korean media companies 
overseas. Instead, the concentration of ownership had deepened as many liberals had worried. 
This again had reflected the old rivalry between the conservative and the liberal in South 
Korea. The concentration of ownership also had discouraged, rather than encouraged, 
diversity of messages and opinions. This might kill the buds of democracy in South Korea by 
limiting the spectrum of opinions among audiences and viewers (Kim, 2008:30-31). 
The KCC was launched as a consolidated agency between the former Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC) and the former Korea Broadcasting Commission 
(KBC). It absorbed communication business license rights that had been supervised by the 
MIC, and expected to manage broadcasting and communications policies and businesses as 
an office of the President. It was to promote and facilitate the convergence of broadcasting, 
telecommunications, and newly emerging media. This means, in a sense, a full renovation of 
regulatory bodies for technological, informational, and social changes in South Korea. As far 
as its purpose was concerned, the KCC was established as an integrated agency responsible 
for industrial promotions and regulations in broadcasting, communications, and media 
sectors. As a matter of fact, however, these purposes might not be acknowledged at their face 
                                                          
7 The reason for critiques on these oligopolistic ownerships can be found in the logic of state in 
regulating fundamental economic and social affairs, including broadcasting and telecommunications. 
The pure discipline of market economy has been regarded as not guaranteeing any equal distributions 
of information among citizens. As more democratic principles have been popularized in the civil 
society of South Korea, the focus in regulating media and telecommunications has moved from the 
sender to the receiver or user (Lee and Kim, 2006:207-210).  




value by many South Korean citizens. The KCC’s legal position was proposed in several 
legal codes in South Korea, including the Broadcasting Act, the Internet Multimedia 
Broadcasting Business Act, the Telecommunications Business Act, the Law on the 
Protection and Use of Location Information, and the Information and Communications 
Construction Business Act. 
South Korea has been a leading country in broadcasting services and has explored the 
convergence of media and information technologies as its primary industrial sector for the 
future. Digital convergence, which has been a new trend in this field, is one of the hottest 
targets in global information and communication industries. Lee’s government in South 
Korea has also planned to promote and implement these convergence technologies and 
reshuffle governmental agencies for their promotions and regulations. Many programs and 
projects have been launched in major industrial fields for this purpose. The KCC was 
expected to drive the growth of new convergence missions as it was intended to spend huge 
amounts of money in information and communications technologies in the near future. A 
number of de-regulatory measures were to be initiated to comply with the global standards 
and trends in IT-related industries and services. 
However, there was another mission for the KCC—to regulate overall IT-related and 
media industries—in the age of technological convergence. This implies a much broader than 
expected influence by the KCC. Both the government and civil society knew this very well, 
so they have argued for and against the jurisdictions of the KCC. According to the theory of 
state capture, regulatory agencies are vulnerable to influence by their stakeholders (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1991:1091-1092).8 Ideally, independent regulators should avoid this situation. 
Major NGOs and civil society groups have argued for recruiting professional experts on 
media services. As expected, regardless of reasonable intentions and commitments laid upon 
the independent regulatory mission by previous regimes, the conflict around the role and 
status of the KCC has become more and more intensified and politicized. 
The most important point regarding the political nature of the KCC is that all five 
candidates for the Commissioners are to be appointed by the President, two of them directly 
and the other three with the recommendations of the National Assembly. These three 
candidates require endorsements by the ruling party or by the opposition party. The ruling 
party holds one ticket while the opposition party holds two tickets for the candidates. This 
means that within the government of the day, whenever the President and his ruling party do 
cooperate, they can jointly monopolize media policy-making. This can become political 
regardless of any enlightened intentions stakeholders have regarding media policy.9  
The problem of the KCC as a new integrated regulatory agency, as noted, seems to be 
reformulated as a trade-off between efficiency and publicity. While former Presidents Kim 
and Roh had intended to increase the level of independence of the regulatory role, the new 
government of Lee Myung-bak wanted to focus on the dimensions of industrial development 
                                                          
8  For the theory of state capture in regulations, see Levine and Forrence (1990), Helm (2006), 
Grzymala-Busse (2008) and Etzioni (2009). Dal Bó (2006) is a comprehensive review on the topic of 
state capture. Hellman et al. (2003) and Iwasaki and Suzuki (2007) discuss the state capture 
phenomena in transition economies. 
9 The KCC started its role as an administrative commission under the President’ Office, which means 
that it is vulnerable to any intentional control of ICT-related and media policies by government. The 
new KCC has caused a lot of debates on its legal status as its foundations were only on public, not 
constitutional, laws (Kim, 2008:31-32). 
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and innovation when they were talking about a new regulatory agency. Their intention was to 
support media industry to gain in competitiveness and efficiency against the challenge of 
foreign companies. They chose efficiency rather than publicity for the new paradigm of 
media policy. Although the establishment of the KCC did not stir additional controversy 
aside from the aforementioned policy issues, the missionary goal had already been changed 
from the previous regimes. And this position would be continued in the case of revising 
media laws. The government aimed to de-regulate the media industry while monitoring 
Internet-based social movements. 
 
 
4. REVISING MEDIA LAWS 
 
Since the inauguration of Lee’s government in 2008, the ruling party and major 
opposition parties in the National Assembly have agreed to revise six media-related laws in 
order to adapt to the trend of convergence among broadcasting, Internet communication, and 
newspapers. The revision of media-related laws was composed of several elements. Firstly, 
cross-ownership between newspapers, news communications, and broadcasting is to be 
allowed. The old regulations had been imposed to block major newspaper owners from 
influencing the formation of public opinion. Ironically, several previous regimes of South 
Korea had confirmed this principle, but any real implementation of this could not be 
validated due to the limitations of South Korean democracy up to the late 1980s. The two 
progressive governments by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun might have tried 
to put this into action, but Lee’s government closed the door on the necessity of de-
regulation of this principle for the reasons mentioned above — i.e. the overwhelming need to 
sharpen the adaptive and competitive edges of South Korean media industries in the age of 
IT and globalization. 
The revision also eliminated the clauses in the newspaper law that prohibited market-
dominating companies from owning broadcasting or newspaper businesses. The regulatory 
measures in the ownership of media industries had been applied to business conglomerates, 
foreign investors, newspapers and news-service companies. These companies could hold 
only limited stocks in any broadcasting companies or channels, except satellite broadcasting, 
system operators, IPTV services, and program providers. For example, big companies, 
foreign investors, newspaper owners could not hold any share in the stocks of terrestrial TV 
broadcasting services, general and news cable programming channels, according to previous 
laws. The new laws would allow them to hold up to twenty to forty-nine percent of the 
ownership shares in these business fields. Additionally, the limit to the one-person-
ownership in these businesses was extended from thirty percent to forty-nine percent.10 
The South Korean government had wanted these de-regulatory measures put in place in 
order for national industries to adapt to the changing environments of world business, such as 
the convergence among IT and broadcasting media. The situation, they argue, had changed 
since the regulatory clauses were incorporated into the legal code in the 1980s. In particular, 
the government and the ruling party of South Korea have hoped to remove any hurdles that 
might have blocked the development of media industries in tandem with the flow of huge 
investments. These logics for the de-regulation could not successfully be used to persuade 
                                                          
10 The limits of ownership shares were set to forty-nine percent for foreign investors to hold stocks in 
system operators, IPTV services, and program providers in the revision. 




the lobbies on the other side, such as civil rights groups and opposition parties. The latter 
worried over the potentially shrinking diversity in public opinion and the dominating power 
of conservative newspaper owners if these de-regulating measures are extended to 
broadcasting businesses. 
Many Koreans have become aware of the bipolarization of newspapers between 
conservatives and progressives: the former have included Chosun, Joong-Ang, and Dong-A 
dailies, while the latter grouped the Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang dailies with some online 
newspapers such as OhmyNews. The impacts of conservative newspapers on the formation of 
public opinion have been greater in South Korea as the conflicts between the North and the 
South have overshadowed the everyday lives of citizens.11 This situation had changed since 
the late 1990s when the liberal regimes by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun accelerated the 
democratization of South Korean politics and pushed IT-based development policies for a 
decade.12 This meant a louder voice for the liberals and the left, while there was less and less 
influence on public opinion by the conservatives and the right. In the field of Korean 
newspaper industries, the political and commercial influences of major conservative 
newspapers dwindled away. In this situation, the de-regulation policy of Lee’s regime—the 
cross-ownership between media groups—may rekindle the power of conservative 
newspapers. 
Secondly, the revision of media laws allowed big companies to hold stocks of 
broadcasting services for up to 20 percent in the case of terrestrial broadcasting; 30 percent 
in case of general cable programming channels; 49 percent in the case of cable news 
channels. It also removed the clause that regulated the ownership of satellite broadcasting 
services. These de-regulation measures were based upon the recognition that South Korea is 
the only country in the world that prohibits big companies from holding large shares of 
broadcasting companies. On the other hand, Lee’s government and its business partners have 
argued for increased investments in broadcasting sectors in order for them to compete with 
global media groups. It was also considered that broadcasting contents would achieve higher 
quality with more financial investment. For these reasons, the de-regulation measures of 
media ownership by big companies were legitimized. 
Many South Koreans hold Janus-faced opinions over big companies. On the one hand, 
they have thought that big business conglomerates, the so-called Chaebul, are the locomotive 
of the Korean economy in both domestic and foreign markets. This has convinced the 
previous regimes to set the priority of economic policy towards supporting and encouraging 
export-oriented industries, most of which have had to be big companies.13 On the other hand, 
                                                          
11 According to a survey conducted by the Korea Press Foundation in July 2008, the circulation ratio of 
newspapers in South Korea was 36.8 percent. The shares of major conservative newspapers are: 25.6 
percent for Chosun, 19.7 percent for Joong-Ang, and 14.3 percent for Dong-A dailies. The sum of 
these closes up to sixty percent. On the other hand, Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang dailies take 5.8 
percent and 3.8 percent, respectively. This means that the conservative South Koreans are relying 
more on newspapers than the liberals in getting information and exchanging opinions (Oh, 2008:146-
147). 
12 Kim Dae-jung had been the President of South Korea between 1998 and 2003, and Roh Moo-hyun 
had followed him in the period between 2003 and 2008. In the early 2008, President Lee Myung-bak 
took over the presidential power with his conservative Grand National Party for the coming five years. 
13 The South Korean government defines big companies or the Chaebul according to the size of 
company assets—one is the group of twenty-trillion-won (slightly less than twenty billion U.S. 
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South Koreans have grown more suspicious of the Chaebuls’ contributions to the national 
economy as they have been thought to violate transparency requirements and social 
responsibility while reinforcing unfair economic practices and class divisions. This has 
roused many social movements and NGOs to push both the National Assembly and the 
government to regulate Chaebuls to compel them to practice good corporate ethics. 
The previous media laws that prohibited big companies from holding large shares were 
the result of these negative opinions in civil society. This trend had been intensified during 
the previous liberal regimes of Presidents Kim and Roh. However, big companies had argued 
against these negative images of themselves, claiming that they were doing their best in 
complying with the regulations. According to them, prior to 2008, South Korea had been the 
only country that did not allow large corporations to hold media ownerships. In their 
perception, this was not a fair policy, because the global trend has been to increase and 
concentrate investments in media industries for competitiveness and efficiency. On the 
contrary, they argued, big companies could upgrade the quality of media through building 
competitive edges and developing smarter business strategies. These arguments have been 
circulated among conservatives before they could join to fight for the revision of media laws. 
The Table 1 shows major changes brought about by the revision of media laws. 
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System Operators — — — — 33% 49% 49% 49% 
IPTV — — — — 49% 49% 49% 49% 
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dollars) or more, and the other is the group of between-ten-trillion-and-twenty-trillion-won. In 2009, 
nineteen conglomerates were included in the first group—such as Samsung, Hyundai Motors, SK, LG, 
POSCO, GS, and KT. The second group held ten Chaebuls in the same year. 




In the end, in July 2009, the National Assembly of South Korea passed three bills that 
revised major clauses in existing laws. Lawmakers from minority parties blocked the paths to 
the assembly conference room to prevent the parliamentary leader from introducing the bills. 
But the voting took place despite multiple fights and shouting matches among lawmakers. 
This was another phase of transition that opened the door to social clashes after the long 
accumulation of ideological distrust and power struggle between liberals and conservatives 
in South Korea. Many liberal and progressive elites in South Korea bemoaned these fights 
and the uncompromising gaps between what appeared to be parallel ideological positions. 
The case of revising media laws in mid-2009 has thus represented the alterity of IT-based 
social transformation that is special and path-dependent for South Korea. 
After one and half years of this social catastrophe, major media groups in South Korea 
applied for licenses to operate new television channels according to the new media law. The 
Lee government plans to choose new channel operators to increase the global 
competitiveness of the local media industry and encourage the content market, as well as to 
offer more variety in programming for TV viewers. The KCC would also plan to 
simultaneously select operators in two categories of general programming and news in 2010. 
Like many other policy issues in South Korea, the case of revised media laws by the Lee 
government has openly exposed the latent seeds of social unrest. The South Korean 
government, having been determined to replace the Internet-induced social chaos with order, 
has thus only started upon its first step toward its own utopia of network society. 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The two cases mentioned above represent a new phase for South Korea to adapt itself to 
the trend of technological convergence in media, broadcasting, information, and 
communications. While many South Koreans had voted for Lee’s government in the election 
of 2007, they did not make an issue out of the full range of their contentious opinions over 
the issue of media regulation. This gap emerged as the conflict between the new government 
and civil society when the latter was enraged over the re-import of beef from America 
despite the population’s worry about mad cow disease in 2008. Lee’s government did adopt 
the position of neoliberalism since it had dominated government policies over the world 
during the late 1990s. Elites in the government have thought that liberal and market-oriented 
policies are an urgent panacea for the deteriorating South Korean economy, particularly in 
the field of converging media technologies.  
One interesting point in this current phase of media policy in South Korea is that the 
country has flip-flopped from the liberal tone to the conservative one with the change of 
regimes, but its direction was different from other countries. Many countries, such as the 
United States and the EU member states, had switched their conservative governments with 
liberal ones at the ballot box over the past decade. But South Koreans chose a conservative 
one after a ten-year period of liberal governments. This seems strange, but understandable, 
as the regimes of Kim and Roh had focused on the democratic and public dimensions of the 
country’s development, while Lee’s new government tried to reset the economic mode 
toward a more market-friendly one. This change of policy environment has had impacts on 
the media-related businesses and policy formation. The KCC and the revision of media laws 
were the result of this change. 
The experiences of the KCC and new media laws represent the path dependence of South 
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Korea in its policy orientation. The Lee government started out in 2008 without expecting 
any social unrest due to beef re-imports. It was a shock to many politicians in the new 
government when civil society protested vehemently over the beef issue, so they tried to 
monitor and regulate any undesirable opinions on the Internet. The project of establishing a 
newly integrated regulatory agency—the KCC—would be a good starting point for 
implementing permanent controls. Although the project was initiated by Roh’s government, 
President Lee had seized upon it to expand governmental control over the entire media and 
Internet sectors. At the same time, Lee’s government tried to persuade the lawmakers and the 
public to support revision of media-related laws in order to broaden opportunities for 
increased investments and ease market entry for major newspaper companies and assorted 
big businesses.  
As such, South Korea has chosen a different path from other developed countries. It does 
not depend only on the new government’s policy orientation but on its own cumulative 
history of liberal government attitudes and highly developed IT industries. This has made a 
softer democracy available in civil society which had never experience so abundant chances 
of political freedom before the 1980s. Ironically, increasing power of civil society has grown 
its own competitor—the government—equipped with the same technology of information 
and communications. The government as well as civil society in South Korea had learned to 
face the challenge of new technologies and subsequent social transformations. In particular, 
conservatives in South Korea had risen again from the long period of liberal regimes of Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The Lee government was representing the turning point of 
South Korean politics from turbulent liberalism to conservatism back again after rounds of 
experiments in democratic consolidation. As a new conservative regime led by Park Geun-
hye was inaugurated in March 2013, the two cases discussed in this paper may still have 
significant implications in the tension between liberals and conservatives as well as in the 
working of a ‘strong state’ biting back at the liberal society that had enlarged in recent years 
following democratization in the 1980s. 
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